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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This employment discrimination action is presented as a 
modern rendition of the age-old parable of a son being 
punished for the sins of his father.1 The father, Sterril 
Fogleman, had been an employee of defendant Mercy 
Hospital, Inc. ("Mercy") for seventeen years before leaving 
the hospital in 1993. In an action separate from this case, 
Sterril sued Mercy claiming that he had been forced out of 
his job due to age and disability discrimination. Sterril's 
son Greg Fogleman, who is the plaintiff in the case at bar, 
also worked for Mercy, being employed as a security guard 
for eighteen years before his termination in 1996. Although 
Mercy claims to have fired Greg for valid job-related 
reasons, Greg asserts that these reasons were pretextual, 
and that the real reasons for his firing relate to his father's 
legal action against Mercy. 
 
Greg sued Mercy under the anti-retaliation provisions of 
three civil rights laws: the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. SS 12101-12213; the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. #8E8E # 621-634; and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. SS 951-963, alleging three theories of illegal 
retaliation. Greg's first theory of illegal discrimination is 
that he was fired in retaliation for his father's having sued 
Mercy for disability and age discrimination. Second, Greg 
claims that Mercy violated the anti-discrimination laws by 
terminating him because it thought that he was assisting 
his father with his lawsuit (even if, in actuality, he was not). 
Third, Greg alleges that he was fired for refusing to 
cooperate with Mercy in the investigation of his father's 
claim. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
Mercy on all of Greg's claims, concluding that none of his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Euripides, Phrixus, frag. 970 ("[T]he gods visit the sins of 
the 
fathers upon the children."); Horace, Odes  III, 6:1 ("For the sins of 
your 
fathers you, though guiltless, must suffer."); William Shakespeare, The 
Merchant of Venice, act III, sc. 5, line 1 ("[T]he sins of the father are 
to 
be laid upon the children."). 
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theories of illegal retaliation were supported by the 
language of the ADA, ADEA or PHRA. 
 
In reviewing the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment with respect to Greg's first claim, we are called 
upon to determine whether the anti-retaliation provisions of 
the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA prohibit an employer from 
taking adverse employment action against a third party in 
retaliation for another's protected activity. The ADA, ADEA, 
and PHRA contain nearly identical anti-retaliation 
provisions that prohibit discrimination against any 
individual because "such individual" has engaged in 
protected activity. 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a); 29 U.S.C. S 623(d); 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 955(d). Although we recognize that 
allowing an employer to retaliate against a third party with 
impunity can interfere with the overall purpose of the anti- 
discrimination laws, we believe that by referring to"such 
individual," the plain text of these statutes clearly prohibits 
only retaliation against the actual person who engaged in 
protected activity. 
 
Unlike the ADEA and PHRA, however, the ADA contains 
an additional anti-retaliation provision that makes it 
unlawful for an employer "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
interfere with any individual" exercising rights protected 
under the Act. 42 U.S.C. S 12203(b). We conclude that 
under this provision, which contains language similar to 
that of a section of the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), that we have interpreted as 
recognizing third-party retaliation claims, Greg's claim that 
he was retaliated against for his father's protected activity 
is valid as a matter of law, and we will therefore reverse the 
grant of summary judgment. 
 
We also believe that Greg's perception theory of illegal 
retaliation -- that he was fired because Mercy thought that 
he was engaged in protected activity, even if he actually 
was not -- presents a valid legal claim. Because the 
statutes forbid an employer's taking adverse action against 
an employee for discriminatory reasons, it does not matter 
whether the factual basis for the employer's discriminatory 
animus was correct and that, so long as the employer's 
specific intent was discriminatory, the retaliation is 
actionable. Accordingly, we will reverse the Court's grant of 
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summary judgment on Greg's perception claim of 
retaliation. We discuss these first two theories in the text, 
infra. Greg's other theory of illegal retaliation -- that he was 
fired for refusing to cooperate with Mercy in the 
investigation of his father's claim -- is plainly without merit 
and we dispose of it in the margin.2 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Members of the Fogleman family have a long history of 
employment at Mercy Hospital. The plaintiff, Greg 
Fogleman, began working for Mercy as a security officer in 
1978. In 1992 Mercy named him Supervisor of Security, a 
post he held until his termination in 1996. Greg's wife, 
Michelle, also worked for Mercy for a few years in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and Greg's mother was an 
employee at Mercy until her retirement in May 1999. But 
the story of this litigation begins with Greg's father, Sterril 
Fogleman, who began working at Mercy in 1976 as an 
engineer and remained on the staff for 17 years, until 1993, 
when the hospital offered him a choice between accepting a 
demotion or leaving the hospital. Sterril chose to leave, and 
suspected that Mercy had pushed him out due to his 
advancing age and his recent loss of sight in one eye. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Greg alleges that Mercy's Vice President for Support Services, Michael 
Elias, called him into his office at least six times to inquire about the 
state of Sterril's claim. In response to Elias's entreaties, Greg 
repeatedly 
responded that he had not discussed the case with his father, and that 
even if he had, he would not discuss the matter with Elias. While an 
employee's refusal to cooperate with management's investigation of a 
claim filed by another employee may constitute protected activity under 
the anti-discrimination laws, see 2 Employment Discrimination S 34.02[2] 
(Lex K. Larson ed., 2d ed. 2001), we do not think that Greg's remarks 
amounted to a refusal to cooperate. Greg's response that he "did not 
discuss" the case with his father indicated only that he had no 
information to provide the hospital. This is not a case, therefore, in 
which an employee refused to share knowledge of a fellow employee's 
claim with his employer. Although Greg claims to have also told Elias 
that even if he had discussed the claim with his father, he would not be 
willing to share the information, we consider this remark gratuitous in 
light of Greg's own admission that he had not broached the issue with 
his father. 
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In June 1995, after satisfying the administrative 
prerequisites, Sterril sued Mercy for illegal discrimination in 
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
Just before trial was to begin, in July 1998, the parties 
settled and the case was dismissed. Greg asserts that he 
did not participate in any way in Sterril's complaints or 
lawsuit. 
 
Shortly after Sterril filed his lawsuit in federal court, 
Martin Everhart, Mercy's Vice President of Human 
Resources, circulated a one-page memorandum to top 
Mercy officials offering a brief explanation of why, in the 
hospital's opinion, Sterril's claim was meritless. The memo 
acknowledged that commenting on Sterril's lawsuit during 
its pendency was "done at some risk as we continue to have 
relatives of Mr. Fogleman employed by Mercy and open 
ourselves up to further public exposure particularly 
through newspapers as this document may be shared that 
way." Greg submits that this language indicates that Mercy 
considered him a "risk" because of his father's lawsuit. He 
also asserts that Everhart was "a bit colder" to him after 
the circulation of this memo. As described in note 2, supra, 
Greg also avers that a representative of management-- 
namely, Michael Elias -- repeatedly questioned him about 
the status of his father's lawsuit in an attempt to pry 
information out of him to aid the hospital in its defense. 
 
On September 6, 1996, Greg was involved in an incident 
at the hospital's gift shop that ultimately provided the 
official -- Greg claims pretextual -- basis for Mercy's 
termination of his employment. Greg claims that he used a 
spare key to enter the hospital gift shop that morning to 
check on the well-being of an elderly woman, Audrey Oeller, 
who worked there as a volunteer. Greg avers that his job 
description authorized him to enter the shop; additionally, 
his supervisor testified that before this incident Greg 
routinely entered the shop to check on Oeller. 
 
The hospital, in contrast, asserts that Greg had no 
authority to enter the gift shop at any time, and that his 
entry was in violation of hospital rules. Moreover, the 
hospital represents that it was troubled by Oeller's 
conflicting account of Greg's reasons for entering the shop. 
According to Oeller, Greg told her that he entered the shop 
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to check on the sprinkler system at the request of 
maintenance supervisor Dave Searfoss. Searfoss, however, 
related to the hospital that he had never made any such 
request of Greg. According to Mercy, Greg also violated 
hospital policy by failing to report the incident to anyone 
until questioned about it, failing to request assistance, 
failing to document the incident until directed to do so, and 
failing to report the taking of the key to the gift shop from 
a secure Maintenance Department Room. 
 
On September 11, the hospital suspended Greg with pay 
in the wake of the gift shop incident pending further 
investigation. Greg claims that he was told that he would 
not receive a final determination on his employment status 
until September 17, which was also the same day that his 
father was to be deposed for his federal lawsuit against 
Mercy. Although it appears that no actual investigation 
took place before September 17, Greg was fired on that day, 
allegedly for reasons related to the gift shop incident. Greg 
avers that his termination was in violation of the hospital's 
progressive discipline policy. Other employees, Greg 
contends, were punished less severely for far more 
egregious infractions. 
 
Greg sued Mercy in the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania alleging violations of the ADA, the 
ADEA, and the PHRA. Mercy moved for summary judgment 
on these claims, and the District Court granted the motion, 
concluding that the statutes did not allow a plaintiff to sue 
on the theory that he had suffered a discharge in retaliation 
for protected activity engaged in by another person, even if 
that other person was a close relative. The Court rejected 
Greg's alternative theories, concluding that they were 
unsupported by the statutory language. This timely appeal 
followed. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. We set forth the familiar standard of review 
for grants of summary judgment in the margin.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
F.R.C.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
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II. The Relevant Anti-Retaliation Provisions 
 
Greg alleges that his termination violated the anti- 
retaliation provisions of the ADA, the ADEA, and the PHRA. 
The ADA's anti-retaliation provision states: 
 
       No person shall discriminate against any individual 
       because such individual has opposed any act or 
       practice made unlawful by this chapter or because 
       such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
       participated in any manner in an investigation, 
       proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). The ADEA and PHRA contain nearly 
identical anti-retaliation provisions, which we quote in the 
margin.4 
 
Because the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA and 
ADEA are nearly identical, as is the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII, we have held that precedent 
interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to 
interpretation of the others. See Krouse v. American 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
language of the PHRA is also substantially similar to these 
anti-retaliation provisions, and we have held that the PHRA 
is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti- 
discrimination laws except where there is something 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of 
       his employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any 
       practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual 
       . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any 
       manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this 
       chapter. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 623(d). Similarly, the PHRA states: 
 
       It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any . . 
. 
       employer to discriminate in any manner against any individual 
       because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this 
       act, or because such individual has made a charge, testified or 
       assisted, in any manner, in any investigation, proceeding or 
hearing 
       under this act. 
 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 955(d). 
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specifically different in its language requiring that it be 
treated differently. See Dici v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996). There is no 
argument made by either party that the PHRA should be 
interpreted any differently from federal law in this case. For 
purposes of this appeal, therefore, we will interpret the 
anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA 
cited above as applying identically in this case and 
governed by the same set of precedents. 
 
In addition to the anti-retaliation provision cited above, 
the ADA has a further anti-retaliation provision not found 
in the ADEA and the PHRA. That provision reads: 
 
       It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
       interfere with any individual in the exercise or 
       enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having 
       exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having 
       aided or encouraged any other individual in the 
       exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected 
       by this chapter. 
 
42 USC S 12203(b). As will appear, this provision, in light 
of its similarity to language in the NLRA, see  29 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(1), is critical to the outcome of this case. 
 
Before analyzing each of Greg's theories of illegal 
discrimination, we note that in order to establish a prima 
facie case of illegal retaliation under the anti-discrimination 
statutes, a plaintiff must show: "(1) protected employee 
activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or 
contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; 
and (3) a causal connection between the employee's 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action." 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500. Because the District Court 
concluded that Greg failed to satisfy the first prong with 
respect to his theories of relief, it never addressed the 
adverse employment action and causation prongs of his 
retaliation claims. Consequently, we do not address those 
issues here on appeal in the first instance. Rather, we 
consider only the District Court's treatment of the 
"protected activity" prongs of Greg's anti-discrimination 
claims. 
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III. Greg's Third-Party Retaliation Claim 
 
In arguing that Mercy unlawfully retaliated against Greg 
for the protected activity of his father, Greg maintains that 
as a matter of statutory construction, the anti-retaliation 
provisions are violated even if the person retaliated against 
did not himself engage in protected conduct. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has filed 
an amicus brief in support of this position. Mercy responds 
that the anti-retaliation provisions only prohibit retaliation 
against a person who himself engaged in protected activity. 
 
A. 
 
In determining whether retaliation against a person who 
has not himself engaged in protected conduct is actionable, 
we first consider the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a), ADEA, 29 
U.S.C. S 623(d), and PHRA, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.S 955(d), 
each of which contains similar language prohibiting 
retaliation. We have yet to decide squarely whether these 
provisions make actionable retaliation against someone who 
has not himself engaged in protected conduct. Among the 
other courts that have addressed the issue no consensus 
has emerged. Some courts have answered the question 
definitively in the negative -- i.e., a plaintiff may not 
present an anti-retaliation claim without personally 
participating in protected activity. See, e.g. , Smith v. 
Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996). 
But other courts have expressly acknowledged the viability 
of third-party retaliation claims. See, e.g., EEOC v. 
Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580 
(D.D.C. 1978). 
 
The plain text of the anti-retaliation provisions requires 
that the person retaliated against also be the person who 
engaged in the protected activity: Each statute forbids 
discrimination against an individual because "such 
individual" has engaged in protected conduct. By their own 
terms, then, the statutes do not make actionable 
discrimination against an employee who has not engaged in 
protected activity. Read literally, the statutes are 
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unambiguous -- indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer way 
of specifying that the individual who was discriminated 
against must also be the individual who engaged in 
protected activity. Furthermore, although there is no Third 
Circuit opinion squarely deciding the issue, the language of 
our opinions has at times reflected this literal 
understanding of the statute. For instance, in Kachmar v. 
Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
stated that "[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory retaliation, . . . [the plaintiff] must show 
. . . that she engaged in protected activity. . . ." Id. at 177 
(emphasis added). 
 
Nevertheless, Greg and the EEOC are correct that a 
literal reading of the anti-retaliation provisions is at odds 
with the policies animating those provisions. The anti- 
retaliation provisions recognize that enforcement of anti- 
discrimination laws depends in large part on employees to 
initiate administrative and judicial proceedings. There can 
be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the 
friends and relatives of employees who initiate anti- 
discrimination proceedings will deter employees from 
exercising their protected rights. Indeed, as the Seventh 
Circuit sagely observed, "To retaliate against a man by 
hurting a member of his family is an ancient method of 
revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor relations." 
NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 
1987). Allowing employers to retaliate via friends and 
family, therefore, would appear to be in significant tension 
with the overall purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, 
which are intended to promote the reporting, investigation, 
and correction of discriminatory conduct in the workplace. 
See De Medina, 444 F. Supp. at 580 (concluding that 
"tolerance of third-party reprisals would, no less than the 
tolerance of direct reprisals, deter persons from exercising 
their rights under Title VII"). 
 
This case, therefore, presents a conflict between a 
statute's plain meaning and its general policy objectives. In 
general, this conflict ought to be resolved in favor of the 
statute's plain meaning. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 
U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that the meaning of 
a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the 
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language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain 
. . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms."). The preference for plain meaning is based on 
the constitutional separation of powers -- Congress makes 
the law and the judiciary interprets it. In doing so we 
generally assume that the best evidence of Congress's 
intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes. See 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 135, 
S 46:03 (6th ed. 2000). 
 
To be sure, however, there are cases in which a blind 
adherence to the literal meaning of a statute would lead to 
a patently absurd result that no rational legislature could 
have intended. Following the letter, rather than the spirit, 
of the law in such cases would go against the court's role 
of construing statutes to effectuate the legislature's intent. 
See United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir. 
1994) ("It is the obligation of the court to construe a statute 
to avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are 
available and consistent with the legislative purpose."). We 
do not believe, however, that this is such a case. Although 
we think, as explained above, that recognizing third-party 
retaliation claims is more consistent with the purpose of 
the anti-discrimination statutes, we cannot say that 
prohibiting such claims is an absurd outcome that 
contravenes the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. 
See In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1993) ("In 
the absence of clearly expressed contrary legislative intent, 
the statutory language must be regarded as conclusive."). 
Rather, while we do not find them particularly convincing, 
there are at least plausible policy reasons why Congress 
might have intended to exclude third-party retaliation 
claims. 
 
For instance, Congress may have thought that "[i]n most 
cases, the relatives and friends who are at risk for 
retaliation will have participated in some manner in a co- 
worker's charge of discrimination," thereby having 
themselves engaged in protected activity. Holt , 89 F.3d at 
1227. If this is true, then the occurrence of pure third-party 
retaliation will be rare, so that not allowing claims to 
proceed in these few instances would not necessarily 
"defeat the plain purpose" of the anti-discrimination laws. 
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Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). 
Put differently, barring third-party retaliation claims will 
not render the antiretaliation provisions completely 
meaningless, since they still prohibit the practice of 
retaliating against an employee for the employee's own 
protected activity, which may be the most common form of 
retaliation. 
 
Moreover, Congress may have feared that expanding the 
class of potential anti-discrimination plaintiffs beyond those 
who have engaged in protected activity to include anyone 
whose friends or relatives have engaged in protected activity 
would open the door to frivolous lawsuits and interfere with 
an employer's prerogative to fire at-will employees. In light 
of these plausible explanations for excluding third party 
retaliation claims, we cannot say that adherence to the 
statute's plain text would be absurd, and we therefore 
conclude that the District Court was correct to reject as a 
matter of law Greg's third-party retaliation claims brought 
under the ADEA, the PHRA, and the first anti-retaliation 
provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S12203(a). 
 
B. 
 
As an alternative basis for his third-party claim Greg also 
relies on the second anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, 
42 U.S.C. S 12203(b), which reads: 
 
       It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
       interfere with any individual in the exercise or 
       enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having 
       exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having 
       aided or encouraged any other individual in the 
       exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected 
       by this chapter. 
 
We have noted that the scope of this second anti-retaliation 
provision of the ADA "arguably sweeps more broadly" than 
the first. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.  162 F.3d 
778, 789 (3d Cir. 1998). In particular, unlike the first 
provision, the text of this provision does not expressly limit 
a cause of action to the particular employee that engaged in 
protected activity. 
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This provision contains language similar to that found in 
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), which 
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer"to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in exercising 
their rights guaranteed under the Act. In Kenrich 
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(in banc), we enforced an order of the National Labor 
Relations Board that interpreted section 8(a)(1) to prohibit 
an employer's retaliation against a supervisory employee 
(who was otherwise unprotected by the Act) for protected 
activity engaged in by her close relatives. We noted that the 
firing of a close relative could have a "coercive" effect on the 
employees engaging in protected activity, id.  at 407, 
instilling "fear that the exercise of their rights will give the 
company a license to inflict harm on their family." Id. at 
409. Our sister courts of appeals have also recognized that 
section 8(a)(1) prohibits the firing of a close relative of an 
employee who engages in activity protected by the NLRA. 
See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 114, 127-28 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co. , 823 F.2d 
1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 
Our interpretations of the NLRA can serve as a useful 
guide to interpreting similar language in the ADA, as both 
are "part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees 
in the workplace nationwide." McKennon v. Nashville 
Banner Pub'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995). The texts of 
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and the ADA's second anti- 
retaliation provision are essentially similar -- each makes it 
illegal for an employer to "coerce" or "interfere with" an 
employee exercising his rights under the act. In view of this 
fact, as well as the similar policies underlying the two 
provisions, it seems sensible to hold, as we now do, that 
Greg may assert his third-party retaliation claim under this 
section of the ADA just as he would be able to do under the 
NLRA.5 Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize that the ADA's second anti-retaliation provision makes it 
unlawful "to coerce . . . any individual" whereas section 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA makes it unlawful to "coerce employees." One could read the 
reference to "any individual" as limiting causes of action to those 
individuals who have themselves engaged in protected activity under the 
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order granting summary judgment to Mercy to the extent 
that it was based on the Court's view that Greg's third- 
party retaliation claim was not cognizable under the ADA's 
second anti-retaliation provision. As noted above, because 
the District Court did not address the second and third 
prongs of Greg's retaliation claim -- adverse employment 
action and causation -- we do not do so on appeal. 
 
IV. Greg's "Perception Theory" of Retaliation 
 
As a final means of showing illegal retaliation under the 
anti-discrimination statutes, Greg argues that even if he 
was not engaged in primary protected activity, Mercy 
perceived him to be so engaged. Greg contends that Mercy 
fired him with the subjective intent of retaliating against 
him for engaging in protected activity, thereby violating the 
anti-retaliation provisions. The District Court disposed of 
this claim as a matter of law, concluding that the statutory 
language did not support a perception theory of retaliation. 
We disagree. 
 
Unlike the interpretation of "such individual" to allow for 
third party claims advocated by Greg that we rejected in 
Section II.A, we do not believe that the perception theory 
contradicts the plain text of the anti-discrimination 
statutes.  Rather, we read the statutes as directly 
supporting a perception theory of discrimination due to the 
fact that they make it illegal for an employer to 
"discriminate against any individual because such 
individual has [engaged in protected activity.]" 42 U.S.C. 
S 12203(a) (emphases added). "Discriminat[ion]" refers to 
the practice of making a decision based on a certain 
criterion, and therefore focuses on the decisionmaker's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ADA in a way that the NLRA's reference to "employees" does not. We do 
not take such a view, however, for we believe that the shared language 
of the two provisions -- the prohibition on an employer "coerc[ing]" or 
"interfer[ing] with" protected activity-- provides the basis for allowing 
third party claims. This is so because action taken against the third 
party employee can have the effect of coercing the employee engaging in 
protected activity, and may also coerce other employees of the company 
from engaging in protected activity in the future. 
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subjective intent. What follows, the word "because," 
specifies the criterion that the employer is prohibited from 
using as a basis for decisionmaking. The laws, therefore, 
focus on the employer's subjective reasons for taking 
adverse action against an employee, so it matters not 
whether the reasons behind the employer's discriminatory 
animus are actually correct as a factual matter. 
 
As an illustration by analogy, imagine a Title VII 
discrimination case in which an employer refuses to hire a 
prospective employee because he thinks that the applicant 
is a Muslim. The employer is still discriminating on the 
basis of religion even if the applicant he refuses to hire is 
not in fact a Muslim. What is relevant is that the applicant, 
whether Muslim or not, was treated worse than he 
otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited by the 
statute. We have adopted this same approach in the labor 
law context, where we have consistently held that an 
employer's discharge of an employee for discriminatory 
reasons amounts to illegal retaliation even if it is based on 
the employer's mistaken belief that the employee engaged 
in protected activity. See Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886, 
891 (3d Cir. 1997); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 
(3d Cir. 1987).  Accordingly, we hold that if Greg can show, 
as he claims, that adverse action was taken against him 
because Mercy thought that he was assisting his father and 
thereby engaging in protected activity, it does not matter 
whether Mercy's perception was factually correct. 
 
As evidence of the hospital's perception that he was 
engaged in protected activity, Greg relies, inter alia, on the 
circulation of Everhart's memo, Everhart's somewhat 
"colder" demeanor toward him after the memo's circulation, 
Elias's repeated questioning, and, of course, his 
termination, which he alleges was in violation of the 
hospital's progressive discipline policy. Because, however, 
the District Court did not in the first instance address the 
question of whether this evidence presented a triable issue 
of fact as to Mercy's perception of Greg having engaged in 
protected activity, we do not delve into it on appeal. Nor, as 
noted above, do we address the second and third prongs -- 
adverse employment action and causation -- of Greg's 
illegal retaliation claim. Rather, we hold only that the 
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District Court erred in concluding that Greg's perception 
theory of illegal retaliation was invalid. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to Mercy will be reversed and 
the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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